Is the United States in Decline?

The United States has been the world’s largest economy since the dawn of the twentieth century and its strongest military power since 1945. Ever since, politicians and pundits have repeatedly fretted that this dominant position was being lost. In the early years of the Cold War, US leaders worried that communism was on the march and saw the launch of Sputnik in 1957 as a sign that the Soviet Union might be forging ahead. In the 1970s, Richard Nixon lamented that if United States were to become a “pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world,” and academics foresaw the United States becoming an “ordinary country.”¹ In the 1980s, historian Paul Kennedy’s best-selling Rise and Fall of the Great Powers warned that America’s global position was threatened by “imperial overstretch,” the same strategic condition that had doomed the British Empire.²

All these gloomy forecasts of American decline turned out to be wrong. Today, however, the combination of China’s rise, Russia’s recovery from its post-Soviet collapse, the emergence of independent medium powers such as Brazil or India, the steady shift of economic power toward Asia, and declining faith in American political institutions has rekindled concerns that the Cassandras may finally be proven right. That fear also reinforced Donald Trump’s slogan to “make America great again.” Will America’s decline have far-reaching and mostly negative effects on world politics?  

This introductory essay advances two main claims. First, I argue that although America’s relative power has declined from its post-Cold War peak, this trend is not as profound as pessimists maintain. The United States still retains enormous advantages relative to all other powers; barring a prolonged series of self-inflicted wounds, it will be the most powerful state in the world for many years to come. Unfortunately, the possibility of decline hastened by misguided policy decisions cannot be ruled out. 

Second, I suggest that there is little to fear if America’s relative power declines somewhat, provided US leaders accept this development and adjust their policies accordingly. On the contrary, a more even distribution of power might be beneficial for the United States and for many others around the world. The United States does not need a position of unchallenged primacy to be secure or prosperous, and a somewhat more even distribution of power would force Washington to eschew the dangerous combination of counterproductive unilateralism and liberal hubris that has roiled world politics in recent decades. Although a few states may be alarmed if they can no longer count on unconditional US protection, on balance a modest decline in America’s power position might be a good thing. 

Is the United States Really Declining? 

Power in world politics is always relative and the balance between states shifts constantly as their capabilities grow (or shrink). If one’s starting point is an unusual moment like 1945 or 1992, when America’s power position was artificially high, then a sense of relative decline is inevitable. The US economy accounted for nearly half of gross world product at the end of World War II, but that percentage fell rapidly as the rest of the world recovered from a hugely destructive war. Similarly, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States “standing alone at the height of power . . . with the rarest opportunity to shape the world,” but this unnatural condition was destined to erode as others rose more rapidly or recovered from recent setbacks.³ The United States still enjoys many advantages relative to the other major powers, however, and these assets are likely to remain intact for many years to come.  

Economic strength is the foundation of national power, and the US economy is still the world’s largest in nominal terms (at roughly 25 percent of gross world product). Its per capita income (~$82,000) is substantially higher than China’s (~$12,500), which means the United States has a much larger surplus of income and wealth that can be directed toward domestic or foreign policy goals.⁴ The US economy is growing more rapidly than the other major industrial democracies; the dollar remains the world’s principal reserve currency; and the central role of US financial institutions gives Washington a unique ability to pressure adversaries by cutting them off from the global financial system.⁵ US firms remain on the cutting edge of many advanced technologies; the US system of higher education is still unmatched; and US cultural institutions continue to cast a large shadow over the rest of the world.   

The United States also enjoys comparatively favorable demography. The populations of Russia, Japan, Germany, China, South Korea, and many other advanced countries will get older and smaller in the years ahead, but the US population will continue to grow and its median age will rise more slowly than the other major powers.⁶ This advantage is due in part to America’s slightly higher birth rate relative to most other wealthy states, but also on its continued ability to attract ambitious immigrants. Unless the entry door slams shut completely, the US labor force will be somewhat larger than its competitors’ as a percentage of population and the percentage of retirees will be lower, which augurs well for sustained economic growth. 

The United States is also the only country that can project substantial amounts of military power to any region of the world. It spends more on defense than the next eight countries combined—and more than twice as much as China—and its network of bases, facilities, and alliance ties dwarfs those of any other country.⁷ Its nuclear arsenal is the world’s most sophisticated and survivable, and no country could seriously contemplate trying to invade, conquer, blockade, or coerce the United States.   

Finally, America’s geographic location remains an enormous advantage. It is the only great power in the Western Hemisphere, and physically separated from the other major powers and most conflict zones by two enormous oceans. Not only does this position reduce the threat of direct invasion to nullity, but it also makes US power somewhat less worrisome to others. Indeed, because the other major powers are close to each other, many of them worry more about their neighbors than they do about the United States and are often eager for US protection. The “free security” provided by America’s providential location gives US leaders considerable latitude in choosing whether or where to intervene abroad and allows them to cut losses and come home when ill-considered foreign policy adventures go awry. 

These are formidable assets that no other country possesses. There is no reason why the United States cannot retain most if not all of them, especially when potential adversaries such as Russia and China face serious challenges at home and abroad. Americans should be upbeat about their country’s position in the world and concerns that China’s rise and America’s fall will soon lead to a great power war are overblown.⁸

To be sure, there are grounds for concern, and Donald Trump’s triumph in the 2024 presidential election magnifies them greatly. Public confidence in government is at all-time lows, the Republican Party’s commitment to the values of an open society is shaky at best, and political polarization has made much harder to devise prompt and effective responses to major challenges. Economic inequality in the US has reached levels unseen for a century, reinforcing popular anger against privileged elites, and a broader assault on science and rationality itself is making it harder to implement policies that will actually work.⁹ Not surprisingly, these developments have tarnished the global appeal of American democracy significantly.¹⁰ Both political parties are increasingly drawn toward protectionism and stringent restrictions on immigration, and the incoming Trump administration is likely to implement them. These are steps that will undermine long-standing sources of economic vitality and growth.   

Second, over the past thirty years, repeated US foreign policy missteps have squandered trillions of dollars that might have been used to make America stronger and tarnished its global image, and are bringing the era of unchallenged US primacy to a premature end. China is now the world’s leading manufacturer and trading nation and may end up dominating key green industries (e.g., battery production, electric vehicles, and renewable power technologies). The “unipolar era” is over, and the United States will have to deal with a world where power is more diffuse and the ability of stronger states to impose their will on others will be more limited. 

Why (Modest) Decline Might Not Be that Bad 

Will the relative decline of US power cause the existing world order to unravel completely and eventually jeopardize America’s security or prosperity? Not necessarily, if the United States responded to this situation with intelligent policy adjustments. As discussed already, only an unprecedented economic or political collapse would remove the United States from the ranks of the great powers or leave it vulnerable to direct attack or external coercion. Even if the United States is somewhat weaker than it is today, the only existential threats Americans are likely to face would be a nuclear war, catastrophic climate change, or the arrival of a pathogen as contagious as and more lethal than Covid-19. As a leading economic power, the United States will retain considerable influence over the global economy and the institutions that govern it and will benefit from trading and investing with others. The United States does not need to dominate distant regions to be safe and prosperous; at most, it needs to help ensure that other major powers do not dominate their own regions and that key global institutions continue to work reasonably well.¹¹

That view is anathema to most members of the US foreign policy establishment, who tend to see any reduction in US dominance as cause for alarm. Convinced that the United States is still the “indispensable power,” they believe unchallenged US primacy is good for the United States and for most of the world as well. According to this view, US power and energetic “global leadership” deters great power war, promotes greater cooperation, and accelerates the spread of cherished US values. The late Samuel P. Huntington captured this view perfectly in 1993, writing that US primacy was “central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.” This comforting belief remains an article of faith within the foreign policy “Blob,” but Trump’s reelection has made it clear that many Americans—and possible a majority—do not share this view.¹²

The foreign policy community’s faith in US leadership assumed that the United States would almost always use its power wisely, but the past thirty years has cast considerable doubt on that assumption. The war in Vietnam notwithstanding, the United States was arguably a stabilizing presence in Europe and Asia during the Cold War. Since 1992, its actions have caused or exacerbated conflicts in several key regions. Unconditional support for Israel and for several Arab autocracies inspired the rise of Al-Qaeda and eventually the September 11 attacks, in turn leading to the “global war on terror” and US interventions regime changes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. These policies cost US taxpayers more than five trillion dollars, produced a set of failed states, and reinforced North Korea’s and Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Open-ended NATO expansion poisoned relations between Russia and the West, created new security obligations but not the means to fulfill them, and eventually led Moscow to launch an illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Instead of creating a “zone of peace” in Europe, US policy made the continent less secure and drove Russia and China closer together.   

Similarly, the supposed wisdom of US economic leadership was less apparent after deregulated financial markets in the United States collapsed in 2008 and triggered a global financial panic, and as overzealous US promotion of “hyper-globalization” cost workers jobs, created overly delicate supply chains, and fueled populist movements on both sides of the Atlantic. Washington also abused its economic clout and control over the SWIFT global payment systems to impose more than 15,000 separate sanctions on foreign governments and individuals—including 60 percent of the world’s low-income countries. US sanctions have inflicted significant harm on the citizens of target countries, but have rarely altered the government’s behavior.¹³

Efforts to promote liberal values have been equally disappointing: Democracy has been in retreat world-wide for nearly twenty years and is under siege in the United States itself.¹⁴ Washington’s claims to defend a “rules-based order” ring increasingly hollow given its repeated refusal to abide by the rules it claims to be defending. Given this track record, it is hardly surprising that many observers think an end to US primacy and the emergence of a more multipolar world is to be welcomed rather than regretted. 

These missteps were not due to a run of bad luck; they were the predictable result of the hubris that typically accompanies unchecked power.  Because the United States was so powerful, wealthy, and secure, those responsible for foreign policy were free to indulge unrealistic fantasies and sustain policies that repeatedly failed, while the costs of their mistakes were borne primarily by others, including some of the societies they were trying to help. 

An end to unchecked US primacy would be good for the United States and the rest of the world alike. It would force US leaders to set clearer priorities and abandon the largely futile effort to shape local politics in every corner of the world. It would encourage top officials to think more carefully about the limits of military power and force other states to take more responsibility for their own security. Abandoning the quest for primacy and adopting more restrained foreign policy would lighten US defense burdens, freeing up resources to meet pressing domestic needs. Acknowledging the limits to US power would also encourage Washington to work with both allies and adversaries to build a more benign world order, eschewing the quest for dominance in favor of a managed competition that maximized areas of cooperation and minimized areas of conflict.¹⁵ The United States could remain committed to spreading liberal values, but at a measured pace and primarily by setting a good example that others might decide to emulate in their own fashion. 

A more restrained US foreign policy would be better for most other countries as well. For starters, other states would no longer have to worry that Washington might use its power in ways that threatened their interests, even if only unintentionally. Furthermore, allies that have repeatedly engaged in risky behavior because they were overly confident of US protection—such as Israel or Saudi Arabia—might be more inclined to moderate their behavior and seek genuine accommodation with long-time adversaries. Allies that have allowed their own defense capabilities to languish would have to take greater responsibility for their own security instead of relying solely on US guarantees. The United States can help maintain favorable balances of power in key regions, but it would be far better if local actors did more to defend themselves and stability in key regions did not depend so heavily on the credibility of US commitments. 

The United States will not be as powerful relative to others as it once was, but this fact is not an argument for isolationism, “America First,” a retreat to protectionism, or the abandonment of long-standing partners or existing global institutions. To repeat: The United States is likely to remain the world’s most powerful country; it just wouldn’t be quite as dominant as it used to be. If it uses that power to oppose clear acts of aggression and to strengthen international norms, but does not try to export its own ideals at the point of gun, peace and prosperity are more likely to prevail.  

Unfortunately, there is little reason to expect a prudent adjustment to slightly diminished power under President Trump. Although he may well avoid some of the unnecessary wars that his predecessors unwisely waged, he could easily stumble into wars of his own or create conditions that render other parts of the world less stable. There can be little doubt that he will either ignore or actively disrupt many of the global institutions that have helped states manage—however imperfectly—their relations and address big global problems for more than seventy-five years.  And his domestic policies—tariffs, mass deportations, the appointment of loyalists in key positions, ending civil service protections, rolling back women’s rights, and dismissing scientific expertise as needed—will leave the United States far weaker than it would have been otherwise.  The recent histories of Argentina, Venezuela, and Great Britain remind us that bad government can do enormous damage even to countries with many advantages, and Americans may be about to experience something similar. 

Conclusion 

“There is a great deal of ruin in a nation,” observed Adam Smith, and especially when a country is as favorably positioned as the United States is. America retains assets that most countries would envy, and those favorable conditions ensure that the United States will remain one of the world’s most important powers for many years to come. US policymakers will still enjoy greater freedom of action than virtually all their counterparts, but whether they use that latitude wisely or foolishly remains to be seen. Will they use these assets to secure the country’s future and to help address a growing array of serious global problems, or will they pursue an agenda that leaves the world and the United States less stable or prosperous than it is today? Unfortunately, odds on the latter outcome rose dramatically on November 5, 2024. 

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University.

1. See Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia,” April 30, 1970, and Richard Rosecrance, ed., America as an Ordinary Country: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976). ↩︎
2. See Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). ↩︎
3. The quotation is from George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 564. ↩︎
4. Michael Beckley argues that “GNP x GDP per capita” is a better measure of raw power than GNP alone. By this measure, the United States is still significantly stronger than China.  See his “The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters,” International Security 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018): 7–44. See also World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2022,” https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/GDP.pdf, and “GDP Per Capita (current US$)” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. ↩︎
5. See Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42–79. ↩︎
6. The US population is projected to grow to roughly 421 million by 2100, while China’s will decline from 1.4 billion today to only 633 million. Japan’s population will shrink from 123 million to 77 million, and Russia’s will decline from 144 million to 124 million. Median age in the United States will rise from thirty-seven in 2010 to forty-one in 2050, but the median age in China in 2050 will be roughly forty-six, Germany will reach a median age of fifty-one, and Japan and South Korea will be the world’s oldest countries at a median age of fifty-three. See “Projections by Country,” Institut National D’etudes Demographique, https://www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_population/data/world-projections/projections-by-countries/; and Pew Research Organization, “Aging in the United States and Other Countries, 2010 to 2050,” January 30, 2014, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/01/30/chapter-2-aging-in-the-u-s-and-other-countries-2010-to-2050/. ↩︎
7. China’s true level of military spending remains controversial; a fair-minded evaluation of this issue is M. Taylor Fravel, George J. Gilboy, and Eric Heginbotham, “Estimating China’s Defense Spending (and how to Get It Wrong),” Texas National Security Review, June 6, 2024, https://tnsr.org/2024/06/estimating-chinas-defense-spending-how-to-get-it-wrong-and-right/. ↩︎
8. Examples of this genre are Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); and Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York: W. W. Norton, 2023). ↩︎
9. See Joseph Stiglitz, “Inequality and Democracy,” Project Syndicate,August 31, 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/inequality-source-of-lost-confidence-in-liberal-democracy-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-2023-08; and Council on Foreign Relations, “The U.S. Inequality Debate,” Backgrounder, April 20, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-inequality-debate. ↩︎
10. Pew Research Center, “What People around the World Like—and Dislike—about American Society and Politics,” November 1, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/11/01/what-people-around-the-world-like-and-dislike-about-american-society-and-politics/. ↩︎
11. This is the logic behind America’s traditional grand strategy of “offshore balancing.” It calls for the United States to help maintain rough balances of power in Eurasia and the Persian Gulf and to prevent “regional hegemons” from emerging there. A rival hegemon in Eurasia might be significantly stronger than the United States and free to intervene around the world as the United States has done. It might even establish a security presence in the Western hemisphere and threaten the US homeland in ways Americans have not experienced for more than a century. China is the only possible regional hegemon today, however, and it faces significant obstacles were it to try to dominate Asia. As a result, maintaining a balance of power in Asia should be relatively easy.  On these points, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016), and Stephen M. Walt, “Stop Worrying about Chinese Hegemony in Asia,” Foreign Policy,May 31, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/31/stop-worrying-about-chinese-hegemony-in-asia/. ↩︎
12. Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 68–83; and Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012–13): 7–51. On the worldview of the foreign policy “Blob,” see Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2018), esp. chapter 3. ↩︎
13. See Jeff Stein and Federica Cocco, “The Money War: How Four U.S. Presidents Unleashed Economic Warfare across the Globe,” Washington Post,July 25, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/interactive/2024/us-sanction-countries-work/. ↩︎
14. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual Democracy Index, in 2023the level of global democracy hit its lowest level since 2006. See Democracy Index 2023, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2023/. ↩︎
15. See Dani Rodrik and Stephen M. Walt, “How to Construct a New Global Order,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 40, no. 2 (Summer 2024): 256–68; and Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War (New York: Hachette, 2022). ↩︎