The Power and the Pragmatism

There is an ancient Chinese saying that is particularly pertinent to the challenges facing Brazil’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century: “Governing a large country is like frying a small fish.” Brazil must exercise extreme precision, delicacy, and constant attention, because mistakes will produce irreparable damage—especially as the international system moves towards multipolarity.

Evidence of the emerging multipolar world order is everywhere. Tech giants like Meta and Google now wield state-like influence, while terrorist groups reshape regional politics. Regional blocs are becoming increasingly important, as seen in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ leadership in South China Sea negotiations and AUKUS’s formation in the Indo-Pacific. And there is a growing challenge to liberal institutions, exemplified by China’s creation of parallel structures like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s confrontation with territorial sovereignty norms, and BRICS’s alternative financial frameworks. This multipolarity is further demonstrated through US–China trade wars that impact global supply chains, the competition for semiconductors and rare earth elements, and the arrival of multiple actors, including private ones, in the new space race. In this fraught and fragmented global landscape, a crucial question emerges: How does a regional power with global ambitions like Brazil navigate this multipolar world?

Multipolarity represents more than a simple quantitative redistribution of material capabilities among states. It is a qualitative transformation in international relations, typified by the growing diffusion of power between state and non-state actors, the regionalization of geopolitical dynamics, and the contestation of norms and institutions that underpinned the liberal international order of recent decades. In this scenario, pursuing autonomy—a state’s capacity to formulate and execute policies based on its interests, free from direct external constraints—assumes particular contours for countries like Brazil.

The evolution of the concept of autonomy in Brazilian foreign policy reflects the transformations of the international system and the country’s position within it. As analyzed by Gelson Fonseca Jr. (1998) and Maria Regina Soares de Lima (2003), in the 1970s Brazil pursued “autonomy through distance,” which saw a calculated distancing from significant powers and an emphasis on autarchic development. Brazil then transitioned to what Fonseca Jr. termed “autonomy through participation” in the 1990s when it sought to influence the construction of international rules and regimes through qualified adherence. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, what Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007) conceptualized as “autonomy through diversification” emerged, emphasizing the multiplication of strategic partnerships and the reduction of asymmetries in external relations. The current moment demands a new understanding of autonomy: “autonomy through complexity”—an approach that recognizes the multifaceted nature of power relations and seeks to maximize the country’s freedom through simultaneous engagement with multiple actors and agendas.

As Brazil pursues autonomy through complexity, the country finds itself in a privileged position to exercise what we can call “positive bargaining” in contrast to the traditional “negative bargaining” characteristic of previous periods. While negative bargaining was based on threats of alignment with rival powers to extract concessions, positive bargaining emphasizes the country’s capacity to add value to different power configurations. In the current competition between the United States and China, for example, Brazil can offer unique contributions to both sides. For the United States, it represents a crucial democratic partner that shares many values and a collaborator in issues such as energy transition and defense. For China, it offers not only strategic natural resources but also a significant market and a gateway to Latin America.

The transformation of multilateral institutions deserves special attention. BRICS, for example, is evolving from a group that initially focused on financial coordination to an alternative global governance platform complete with its own international institutions, such as the New Development Bank. The Group of 20, in turn, is consolidating itself as the main forum for global economic governance, offering Brazil a permanent seat in discussions about how to reconfigure the international financial system. The World Trade Organization crises (the paralysis of its dispute-settlement system and the organization’s struggles to manage trade conflicts between major powers) as well as debates about its reform present risks and opportunities for Brazil to rethink its role in global value chains and international trade governance.

Then there is another matter of supreme importance: the relative decline of the United States as a global hegemonic power. This “imperial decline” leaves a legacy not only of established international institutions but also of weakening global norms and spaces of power freshly in dispute. And the current hegemonic transition is historically distinctive because of the interdependence of technological globalization, in which the very nature of international power is transformed.

For Brazil, the transition to a multipolar world does not represent as dramatic a rupture with the status quo as it does for some other nations, especially considering the South American context. In the region, the United States has long been a power that only makes selective and intermittent appearances: in the economic field, through the absence of major regional development initiatives since President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress in 1961; in security, through selective engagement in issues beyond drug trafficking and migration; and in the political dimension, through the reduction of American capacity to influence regional political processes. Concrete cases illustrate this dynamic, such as the limited US response to the Venezuelan crisis, the growing space for Chinese presence in regional strategic sectors, and the region’s countries’ search to develop relations with extra-regional powers without facing the characteristic restrictions of the Cold War.

Still, Brazil requires a guiding principle for how to navigate this increasingly complicated and dynamic world, while also achieving autonomy through complexity: pragmatism in foreign policy. This is a sophisticated strategic approach that recognizes the multifaceted nature of contemporary international power. Brazilian strategic pragmatism is grounded in the understanding that, in a transforming international system, the capacity for adaptation and the ability to build bridges between different poles of power are as important as traditional material resources.

Brazil’s choice of pragmatism over ideological alignment represents a deliberate strategic decision, not a default position. While pragmatism enables flexible, interest-based engagement with multiple powers, the alternative path of ideological alignment would either bind Brazil to Western liberal values and institutions or position it as a Global South leader challenging the existing order. By choosing pragmatism, Brazil maintains autonomy between great powers, leverages relationships for development, and adapts to shifting power dynamics while avoiding the rigid constraints that characterized its past ideological foreign policy approaches.

This conception of pragmatism is intrinsically linked to the exercise of power by states with limited resources, a phenomenon extensively studied in international relations literature. Authors such as Robert Keohane (1969), in his work on “small powers” (lilliputians), or Randall Schweller (1994) analyzing “bandwagoning for profit” strategies, offer theoretical tools to understand what some would call the “geopolitics of the weak”—the art of maximizing international influence without predominant material resources. Within this perspective, Brazil seeks to expand its international projection by constructing strategic alliances, actively participating in multilateral forums, using soft power intelligently, and leveraging regional and global influence niches (as evidenced by Brazil’s pivotal role in climate negotiations, where it helped bridge the gap between developing and developed nations at Conference of the Parties 15 in Copenhagen by voluntarily proposing ambitious emissions reduction targets). This approach recognizes that, in the twenty-first century, international power manifests not only through coercion or material capacity but also through the ability to influence agendas, shape preferences, and build consensus—elements that Nye (2004) characterized as crucial dimensions of power in the context of complex interdependence, and that authors like Barnett and Duvall (2005) expanded in their taxonomy of the different faces of power in international relations.

For Brazil, the pursuit of autonomy through strategic pragmatism is structured around three fundamental objectives. The first is development, understood as economic growth and strengthening national capabilities across multiple dimensions. The second is risk diversification (“hedging”), which means maintaining numerous strategic partnerships to reduce vulnerabilities and dependencies. The third is the democratization of voices that shape the global order: the search for representation in international institutions and the revision of the international system’s rules.

Brazil’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and pragmatism has a number of immediate applications. In the technological field, it implies developing local capabilities in strategic sectors such as biotechnology, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and space technology, as well as strengthening the national industrial-scientific complex. The productive dimension involves diversifying the industrial base and developing regional value chains that reduce vulnerabilities in strategic sectors. In the energy sphere, it means harnessing the potential of renewable energies, creating the green hydrogen industry, and maintaining leadership in biofuels.

Brazil traditionally adopts an inclusive approach to international relations, preferring an “and” rather than “or” strategy (pursuing ties with both BRICS and Western institutions, maintaining balanced relations with both the US and China, and actively participating in both regional American forums and global governance institutions, rather than choosing between these spaces). This posture allows it to maintain constructive relations with different poles of power, avoid automatic alignments, and preserve its decision-making autonomy while maximizing opportunities for cooperation.

This “and” rather than “or” strategy should not be confused with a stance of mere passive neutrality. On the contrary, it represents a sophisticated understanding of contemporary international power dynamics, where the very nature of global influence is in transformation. The ability to navigate between different power configurations while maintaining constructive dialogues with diverse actors becomes itself a source of power. This approach allows Brazil to diversify risks, maximize economic opportunities, and assume unique roles as a bridge-builder in situations of international tension, a mediator in regional conflicts (as demonstrated by its mediation of the Iran nuclear dispute through the 2010 Tehran Declaration, its role in easing tensions between Venezuela and Colombia, and its diplomatic intervention during Bolivia’s 2008 political crisis), and a consensus facilitator in complex global issues.

Of course, this comes with costs: Brazil’s main challenge will be resisting growing pressure for definitive alignments in an increasingly polarized world. Although challenging, the “fence-sitter” position—in which a country avoids taking definitive sides in geopolitical disputes, as Matias Spektor (2023) calls it—aligns with long-term national interests and Brazilian diplomatic tradition. This posture does not reflect indecision but rather a conscious strategic choice that seeks to maximize national autonomy in growing competition between great powers.

For Global South countries, maintaining open communication channels with all significant actors in the international system and preserving flexibility to adapt their foreign policies are strategic imperatives, not necessarily ideological choices. Although this posture may amplify competition between great powers by allowing developing countries to engage with different alliances and partnerships, it also creates significant opportunities for the West, as it makes permanent alignment with China or Russia unlikely. Taking advantage of these opportunities, however, depends on the West’s capacity to abandon expectations of automatic alignment, while also taking the Global South’s concerns earnestly and seeking pragmatic cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as climate and trade (see Spektor, 2023).

Regarding strategic global issues, Brazil has unique conditions for exercising leadership. In the environmental and climate agenda, the country can lead the development of a green economy and the monetization of ecological assets. Its position as an agricultural power in food security allows it to influence debates on global food systems and sustainable agricultural development. In both cases, the challenge lies in translating comparative advantages into adequate agenda-setting power internationally.

Brazil’s projection of power on the international stage in the twenty-first century is particularly shaped by its position as South America’s largest economy. In the region, Brazil leverages its industrial base and market size to promote productive integration through initiatives like automotive sector agreements with Argentina, leads infrastructure projects such as the Bi-Oceanic Corridor, and spearheads defense cooperation through mechanisms like the South American Defense Council. This distinctly Brazilian approach to regional leadership, focused on industrial integration and infrastructure development rather than traditional security alliances, provides a foundation for its global ambitions, especially in areas where the country has natural advantages like renewable energy and agribusiness.

Of course, the structural challenges for implementing this strategy are considerable, especially at the domestic level. The governance of Brazilian foreign policy traditionally needs to improve on problems of interministerial coordination (as seen in the often-conflicting positions between the Agriculture and Environment ministries on climate commitments), decision-making fragmentation, and limited implementation capacity. The growing complexity of international issues demands a modernization of the state apparatus focused on international relations, including not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) but the entire government structure involved with external issues. This implies developing more effective mechanisms between different agencies, strengthening technical capacity in strategic areas, and creating more agile instruments to respond to international opportunities and challenges. Brazil’s historical experience shows that success is achieved with clear articulation between external objectives and national development projects. This articulation demands attention to issues such as social inclusion, digital transformation, and bioeconomy—where Brazil’s natural assets (like its biodiversity and renewable energy potential) need to be transformed into actual market advantages through investment and policy coordination.

Developing specific state capabilities for foreign policy management in a multipolar world also deserves consideration. This includes strengthening strategic intelligence, developing expertise in new technologies and their geopolitical implications, building capacity in complex negotiations involving multiple actors and themes, and improving the ability to analyze and forecast international scenarios. Creating effective knowledge management mechanisms is a crucial element in this process.

The subnational dimension of foreign policy is also gaining increasing relevance. Brazilian states and municipalities continue to develop their own strategies, whether attracting investments, technical cooperation, or participation in thematic international networks. The coordination between these initiatives and national foreign policy represents an additional challenge and an opportunity to expand and diversify the country’s channels of international insertion.

Last but not least, the success of Brazil’s international insertion in a multipolar world will depend on a combination of strategic pragmatism and holding to a long-term vision. This has historically been challenging for the country: nuclear cooperation with Argentina in the 1970s, for instance, was affected by regional rivalries; in the 1980s technology policies limited international integration; and in the 1990s, shifting approaches to privatization impacted strategic planning. These examples demonstrate how domestic political cycles have often impacted Brazil’s ability to maintain consistent, pragmatic long-term policies in its international engagement.

Building internal consensus on foreign policy priorities assumes crucial importance in this context. Recent experience shows that volatility in foreign policy orientations can compromise the country’s international credibility and reduce its capacity for influence. The challenge lies in building institutional mechanisms that ensure certain predictability and continuity in Brazil’s international actions without sacrificing the necessary flexibility to adapt to changes in the global scenario.

The key to success will lie in translating the country’s comparative advantages into adequate power through a sophisticated foreign policy that combines elements of continuity with adaptability to changes in the international system. As in the Chinese saying about frying a small fish, success will depend on precision in execution and a deep understanding of the context in which one operates. In a multipolar world characterized by growing complexity and uncertainty, the ability to navigate between different centers of power while maintaining autonomy and promoting pragmatic national interests becomes not just a desirable objective but a fundamental strategic necessity.

Fernanda Magnotta, Ph.D. in International Relations, is a professor and U.S. policy expert who heads the International Relations Program at FAAP (São Paulo) and serves as Senior Fellow at CEBRI and Global Fellow at the Wilson Center. She is a regular media contributor and project leader connecting Brazil-U.S. stakeholders.