International Justice and Global Order in the 21st Century

I am honored to complement Aryeh Neier’s analysis of the international criminal justice system in The Ideas Letter. Aryeh, who transformed his experience of escaping the Nazi regime with his parents in 1939 into a lifelong commitment to the law, is a role model for me.

Aryeh firmly believes that the law is the way to restrain power and protect people. One of the best examples was his controversial decision, as executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, to defend a neo-Nazi group’s right to march and speak in Skokie, Illinois in 1978.

As he explained it to me: “Some people asked how I, as a Jew, could defend the rights of neo-Nazis? My answer is because I am a Jew, I learned that to be protected, I must defend the rights of everyone, including my enemies.”

Aryeh understood that the Jewish community in Skokie would be protected by the legal system. Legal designs are almost invisible, yet they are a matter of life or death. Legal architecture has the power to facilitate or control violence.

Since the 1990s Aryeh has supported efforts to create international criminal tribunals to protect individuals around the world the way U.S. citizens are protected at home.

I am personally thankful because Aryeh organized the first meeting with civil society organizations at the Open Society Foundations’ New York office when I was appointed the International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor in 2003. The encounter inspired a tradition of bi-annual meetings between the Prosecutor and civil society organizations in The Hague and later expanded to the entire Court.

I hope here to complement Aryeh’s recent account of the international criminal justice system in The Ideas Letter by presenting the main achievement of the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court: it overcame the fierce opposition of the United States, and moved from paper to reality.

The U.S., the most powerful nation in the world, with a constitution that protects freedom and guarantees fair trials at “home,” even to neo-Nazis at Skokie, has not promoted similar ideas “abroad.”

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has adopted a national defense strategy based on military deployment “abroad.” Such a policy is in conflict with any independent justice system, including the U.S. system, that is able to investigate U.S. personnel.

Realist international relations scholars provide the rationale. For them, the world is anarchic because there is no central authority and therefore “states must provide security for themselves because no one else will.”¹ They consider war to be the most relevant mechanism to resolve transnational conflicts and dismiss the law as something cherished by idealists, liberals, leftists, or legalists.

The Rome Statute, adopted in 1998, introduced a new legal design. State parties created a peculiar confederation of nations connected with a permanent International Criminal Court that aimed to end the impunity for the most serious crimes and to contribute to their prevention.

In June 2003, just three months after the beginning of the Iraq intervention and in the middle of the military operations, I assumed duties as the first ICC Chief Prosecutor. There were many doubts about the Court’s viability. Many state parties were “apprehensive about being perceived as an adversary to the United States,” according to diplomat Didier Pfirter.² Even some of the ICC’s judges had reservations.³

Just two decades later, the Rome Statute and the ICC are part of the international institutional landscape. The Rome Statute’s innovative model performed, and its existence is no longer at risk. Karim Kahn, the current ICC Chief Prosecutor, obtained an arrest warrant in 2023 against President Putin for war crimes and visited Israel and Ramallah a few weeks ago.

International criminal justice to protect individuals around the world is now a reality, and “it not only raises expectations of prosecution; it shapes social expectations about what constitutes justice more broadly,” according to academics Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons.⁴

Its relevance to deter crimes is a different matter and requires us to compare the ICC with its legal mandate and the support or the attacks it received in specific situations.

“The Court has jurisdiction in a domain where military and strategic logic generally prevails.”

War as a conflict management mechanism and the emergence of international criminal justice.

Different scholars rightly point out that international law did not deter the Nazi regime’s aggression. But, instead of improving the international legal architecture, they disregard the entire enterprise as a utopian mistake, “harmful in directing attention away from the need to prepare for the inevitable aggression when it came,”⁵ according to international lawyer and professor Martti Koskenniemi.

Following World War II, the U.S. led the design of a new global order that departed from the consensus required by the League of Nations and concentrated power in the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members.⁶

The U.N. Charter did not adopt independent international mechanisms to protect individuals and did not even mention international criminal justice. The investigation and prosecution of crimes remained within national purview, a critical part of sovereignty.⁷

Nuremberg and the Cold War

Joseph Stalin became the unlikely champion of international justice. During a September 1944 meeting in Quebec, Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to execute Nazi leaders without trial.⁸ Stalin forced a change—and the political decision to prosecute the Nazi’s defeated leaders.

The U.S. Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson, eloquently presented international criminal justice as a tool to help to manage conflicts between nations in his opening statement before the tribunal: “This principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as logical one if international law is to render real help to the maintenance of peace.” He mentioned that in the past “the only answer to recalcitrance was impotence or war. Only sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and effectively be enforced.”⁹

But, as Aryeh Neier noted in his piece, the Cold War froze support for international criminal justice. Focused on balancing the major powers, the world was not ready to transform Nuremberg into a lasting institution. Fear of a nuclear conflict prevented a hot war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but conflict was nonetheless heated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

During this period, with the exception of President Jimmy Carter, both the U.S. and the USSR denounced crimes committed by their enemies and covered up those committed by their friends. Because of the U.N. Charter’s legal design, there are no institutional solutions to solve problems between the Council’s permanent members.

Since 1948’s ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights¹⁰, the international community adopted many treaties establishing individual rights.¹¹ But their enforcement is the prerogative of national authorities, a weakness that allows critics to paint those treaties as idealism.¹² Respect for human rights remained at the mercy of domestic authorities.

The Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court

The end of the Cold War heralded a new era for international justice. In 1993 and 1994, the U.N. Security Council built on the Nuremberg legacy and established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

The ad hoc international tribunals had independent prosecutors and judges, but they were confined to prosecuting cases in a particular territory and at times defined by the U.N. Security Council.

Subsequently, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon participated in a series of “hybrid” tribunals combining national and international judges.

The ad hoc tribunals paved the way for the 1998 Rome Conference, with representatives from 160 states.

The most divisive topic of the Rome Conference was granting the prosecutor independent authority to trigger an ICC intervention into a sovereign state.

The U.S. agreed on the need for a permanent court and on what are the “most serious crimes of international concern”: Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The crime of aggression was included, but its definition was postponed.

Nonetheless, the U.S. sought to control ICC interventions through the U.N. Security Council. Following the ad hoc tribunals model, the United States proposed that the U.N. Security Council would decide where and when the Court should intervene, while the ICC Prosecutor should independently select incidents and suspects but only among those situations selected by the U.N. Security Council or states.¹³

One hundred and twenty states rejected the U.S. stance and made the sovereign decision to accept the independent intervention of the International Criminal Court in their jurisdiction if they failed to investigate or prosecute crimes outlined in the treaty.

The Court acts under the principle of complementarity; if national authorities are investigating a case, the ICC should not intervene. According to its legal design, the best outcome of the Rome Statute is for the ICC not to open an investigation.

The agreement rejected universal jurisdiction; the ICC can independently investigate crimes committed only in the state parties’ territory or by their personnel. The Statute also recognized the prerogatives of the U.N. Security Council on matters of peace and security, establishing the Council’s authority to refer situations to the ICC and to suspend any investigation for one year.

The ratification of the Rome Statute was a collective global operation. Lawmakers had to approve the Statute in most countries, and several had to amend their constitutions. For instance, France and Colombia included a new article in their Constitutions. Germany reformulated specific constitutional principles, and the Netherlands created a particular procedure to approve the Statute even where there were some conflicts between its Constitution and the Statute. Spain’s Consejo de Estado interpreted the Statute to avoid a confrontation with its Constitution.

The 60-country ratification threshold was reached in just four years, by July 2002. Senegal was the first country to ratify.

Unlike the Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, the Rome Statute created more than a court to conduct fair trials; it established a formal network of horizontal and vertical international cooperation¹⁴ based on complementarity. Evaluation of the statute must respect its legal design.

The Rome Statute is the first serious attempt to coordinate matters of international peace and security between sovereign states—on equal footing. For the first time since 1945, the U.S. did not lead innovations on the international legal architecture.¹⁵

The ICC is not a utopia; it is a reality. The Rome Statute created power—the ICC prosecutor has the authority to request arrest warrants for the heads of state of more than 100 nations—that can increase cooperation and reduce anarchy.

The Rome Statute v. the “War on terror.”

Conflict between the U.S. and the ICC increased when the United States adopted a different model to control violence from abroad following Sept. 11: the War on Terror.

Within hours of the al Qaeda attacks, the U.S. shifted from addressing terrorism as a law enforcement problem to one of war.¹⁶ Terrorist suspects “abroad” were no longer treated as criminals to be investigated; instead, they were regarded as enemies to be killed.

The U.S. decision to attack individuals is in keeping with the vision of 17th Century Dutch lawyer and philosopher Hugo Grotius, who argued that the reasons to wage war are identical to those that prompt lawsuits: “War is a substitute for courts, because courts are the original substitutes for war…The function of war is to right wrongs.”

In 2002, U.S. lawmakers passed the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA), which prohibited U.S. cooperation with the ICC, including funding or sharing classified information.¹⁷ It blocked U.S. aid to allies unless they signed accords to shield American troops on their soil from being turned over to the ICC. It also authorized the president to take any necessary action to rescue U.S. personnel handed over to the ICC, a direct threat to invade the Netherlands. ASPA continues to define the U.S. vote at the U.N. Security Council and blocks any U.N. financing of ICC operations.

The March 2003 international military intervention in Iraq led by the United States multiplied U.S. efforts to undermine the Rome Statute system.

I was not involved in the discussions of either the Rome Statue or the War Terror. But I became a participant and a privileged witness of how they were implemented during their first years.

To fully respect my mandate, including the principle of complementarity, during my term, the prosecution conducted a number of preliminary examinations: two in Asia (Korea and Afghanistan), one in the Middle East (Palestine), one at the crossroads of Western Asia and Eastern Europe (Georgia), two in Africa (Nigeria and Guinea), one in Central America (Honduras), two in South America (Colombia and Venezuela), and one in Europe (UK personnel involved in Iraq).

Aryeh Neier’s piece ignored the preventive impact of this preliminary examination phase. Colombia is the best example. The ICC’s preliminary examination helped to prevent crimes and demobilize paramilitary and guerrilla groups without opening an investigation.

The office also conducted seven other preliminary examinations in Africa, analyzing the commission of crimes under the ICC jurisdiction and the existence of national proceedings.

The prosecution opened investigations in the two more serious situations admissible under our jurisdiction: Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda. We opened the investigation after the countries referred to us their own situation, dissipating the fears of violating sovereign rights expressed at Rome. Then, without our intervention, the Central African Republic referred to our office its own situation.

Against any expectation, in March 2005 the nine members of the U.N. Security Council, led by France, forced the U.S. and China to abstain and to allow the Darfur referral.

I used my independent authority in Kenya to investigate massive crimes committed during the 2008 elections and requested authorization to the ICC’s pre-trial chamber. Out of respect for national authorities, I announced the investigation in the Presidential palace in Nairobi, accompanied by Kenya’s President and Prime Minister.

In 2011, the U.N. Security Council referred the Libya situation by consensus, including Russia, China, India, Lebanon, and the U.S. affirmative votes.

Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo and his successor Alassane Ouattara accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. African leaders were involved in all the investigations opened.

The “African bias” campaign launched by President Al Bashir to cover his crimes against Africans is one of the best examples of replacing the Rome Statute standards for commentators’ criteria. Staying true to its legal mandate, the ICC was involved in African situations because massive crimes occurred while national authorities conducted no investigations. The refusal to open investigations in Africa would have been an ICC’s bias.

The alleged solution proposed by “African bias” critics was to open investigations in other regions, ignoring the preliminary examination rules, and assuming a legal duty to respect ethnic, geographic, or gender diversity. Such opinions neglected the crimes committed and supported those African leaders attacking Africans.

Furthermore, when ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda opened investigations against U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, these critics did not defend her.

Overall, during my tenure, we requested arrest warrants and summons to appear for 31 individuals identified as those most responsible for the massive crimes committed, including militia leaders such as Joseph Kony and heads of state Omar al Bashir, Muammar Gaddafi, and Laurent Gbagbo. The pre-trial chambers, in turn, reviewed the prosecutor’s evidence and issued all of them.¹⁸

The Office of the Prosecutor participated in seven confirmations of charges before the pre-trial chamber to review the evidence before going to trial and in three trials.

The Office of the Prosecutor scrupulously respected the Rome Statute’s legal framework. We rejected demands to apply extra-legal standards, including (a) expanding the rules of jurisdiction to accept Palestine’s requests, (b) balancing the ethnicity of the defendants to avoid an alleged “African bias,” (c) granting that local Uganda’s constituencies like the Acholis have the right to stop the Office of the Prosecutor’s interventions; (d) to request U.N. Security Council referrals; and (e) that negotiations for peace agreements should be prioritized on top of the office duties to investigate and to prosecute.

In all the cases presented, the chambers confirmed the prosecution delimitation of the ICC jurisdiction. The fears of a frivolous prosecutor or an ever-expanding International Criminal Court were not confirmed.

At the end of my term, after nine years of operations, forty-three 43 additional states ratified the statute and joined the system, reaching 121 state parties. They spent hundreds of million euros on building the court’s permanent seat at The Hague. In February 2011, the U.N. Security Council, by consensus, referred the Libya situation to the ICC. In September 2012, the U.N. General Assembly recognized the ICC’s central role for all states.¹⁹ In October of that year, the U.N. Security Council held a meeting to discuss “Peace and justice, with a special focus on the role of the International Criminal Court.” In that meeting, states non-parties like China, the United States, Russia, and even Sudan, a country presided over by a person indicted by the ICC for genocide, recognized the International Criminal Court’s importance.²⁰

The process continues. The Philippines and Burundi withdrew from the statute in 2017 and 2018 aiming to protect their leaders allegedly involved in crimes under the court’s jurisdiction. Five new parties joined the Rome Statute including Armenia after the alleged genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh. Today the total number of parties is 124.

Measuring Relevance

Measuring the preventive impact of an autonomous criminal justice system that works worldwide, combining national institutions and a permanent court working under the complementarity principle, presents a unique challenge.

Analyzing the number of cases before a court created to act by default ignores its innovative legal design and fails to properly evaluate the Rome Statute system. A proper evaluation of the Rome Statute should take into account the actions of all the members of the treaty and other relevant actors preventing, investigating, and punishing the crimes.

In 2003, upon taking office, I proposed that “the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court should not be measured by the number of cases that reach it. On the contrary, complementarity implies that the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.”²¹

But the innovative international criminal justice system, aimed at constraining power, conflicts with the old system of leaders imposing their will through violence. The U.S. preferred policy of war to manage conflict is failing in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, in the case of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and Israel’s bombing of Gaza and starvation of its residents. Yet, there are no alternate proposals from the U.S. experts.

Conclusion

We celebrate technological innovation and neglect institutional development. The Rome Statute, which created a system of international criminal justice that includes an independent and permanent criminal court, is a paradigm shift of the international order, and is firmly a part of contemporary reality.

Jo and Simmons “acknowledge what few would have doubted: the ICC’s contribution to deterrence is conditional. The ICC may have varying effects on different categories of actors, depending on (1) their exposure to the risk of prosecution and (2) the importance they attach—or the vulnerability they believe they have—to the social costs of criminal law violation.”²²

The U.S. has relied on war as a mechanism to manage international conflicts in the 21^st Century, and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine threw the world in a new Cold War and at risk of a nuclear confrontation. The decision to use war reveals a blind spot, impervious to facts.

Though allegations that Iraq had chemical weapons that could power terrorist attacks was ultimately proved false, the U.S. Congress’s authorization to use military force in Iraq remains valid in 2024, and it was used in 2020 by President Trump to kill an Iranian general and Iraqi citizens.

The U.S. has accepted ad hoc international criminal tribunals at Nuremberg, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda to prosecute enemies or outcasts, but refuses to contemplate such instances for U.S. troops or its allies.

The U.S. expert community knows that the military model to face international terrorism is not working, but it cannot discuss a different paradigm. As former CIA head John Brennan observed, the lack of a collective frame created a return to tribalism.²³

One of my sons introduced me to Fortnite Battle Royale, a tremendously popular game in which 100 players compete to kill each other. The winner is the last one standing. By design, the champion will be left alone. It is a good metaphor for our current global order.

The idea of exterminating one’s enemies is killing civilization.

The horrific Hamas October 7, 2023, attack created solidarity with Israel, but its military reaction affecting millions of civilians isolated the country. War promotes revenge. Instead, justice reduces it. “ICC deterrence may contribute to breaking cycles of violence committed on both sides of a conflict,” write Jo and Simmons. ²⁴

It is the time to take the side of the victims: Hamas’ victims, Netanyahu’ victims.

As Aryeh explained in his book on the Skokie case: “as a Jew, therefore, concerned with my own survival and survival of the Jews—the two being inextricably linked—I want restraints placed on power.”²⁵

Luis Moreno Ocampo was the founding Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. He is the author of War and Justice in the 21^st Century, Oxford University Press (2022).

1. Stephen Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition, in Political Science, State of the Discipline III (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2003). ↩︎
2. Didier Pfirter, The Position of Switzerland with Respect to the ICC Statute and in Particular the Elements of Crimes, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. 499, 505 (1999). ↩︎
3. David Bosco, Rough Justice, The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics 81 (Kindle ed. 2014). ↩︎
4. Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” (2016). All Faculty Scholarship. 1686. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1686 ↩︎
5. Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 455, 455 (1996). ↩︎
6. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, pp. 93-4 ↩︎
7. In 1948 Hans Morgenthau considered: “the ultimate decision as to whether and how to engage in a law enforcing action lies with the individual state.” Hans J. Morgenthau, The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered, 48 Colum. L. Rev., 341, 344–45 (1948). ↩︎
8. The Soviets preferred rigged show trials, along the lines of the 1936–1938 Moscow purge trials. Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance 195 (Kindle ed. 2000). For background on the Great Terror’s transformation and integration into Soviet society, see Wendy Z. Goldman, Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression (2007); and Shelia Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (1999). ↩︎
9. Opening Statement before the International Military Tribunal, Robert H. Jackson Center, https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/opening-statement-before-the-international-military-tribunal/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2021). ↩︎
10. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on 10 December 1948. ↩︎
11. The list of the treaties registered with the UN Secretariat pursuant to Article 102 of the UN Charter includes Convention on the Political Rights of Women. New York, 31 March 1953; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. New York, 7 March 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. New York, 16 December 1966; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. New York, 16 December 1966; Convention on the non- applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity. New York, 26 November 1968; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. New York, 30 November 1973; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York, 18 December 1979; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. New York, 10 December 1984; International Convention against Apartheid in Sports. New York, 10 December 1985; Convention on the Rights of the Child. New York, 20 November 1989; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. New York, 15 December 1989; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. New York, 18 December 1990; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. New York, 13 December 2006; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. New York, 20 December 2006. ↩︎
12. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law 79 (Kindle ed. 2001). “A utopia critique argues that a given decision is too far divorced from political power, thus potentially lacking effectiveness.” Sophie T. Rosenberg, The International Criminal Court in Côte d’Ivoire, Impartiality at Stake?, 15 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 471, 486 (2017). ↩︎
13. “At the same time, however, we support giving maximum independence and discretion to the prosecutor in his or her proper sphere.” Bill Richardson, Ambassador US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement at the UN Plenipotentiaries Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (transcript available in II Summary Records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole) UN Press Release #108 (98) (June 17, 1998) in David Scheffer, False Alarm about the Proprio Motu Prosecutor in The First Global Prosecutor: Promise and Constraints (Law, Meaning and Violence) 29, 31 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 2015). ↩︎
14. Slaughter, A., A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004) ↩︎
15. Slaughter conceptualized a “new world order” based on an intricate three-dimensional web of links between disaggregated state institutions. The Rome Statute is one of the best examples of that concept. ↩︎
16. Goldsmith, J. The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush administration (W.W.Norton & Company, 2007) p.102 ↩︎
17. American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–206 (amended by Pub. L. No. 110–181, enacted Jan. 28, 2008). ↩︎
18. Our policy was to focus our investigation on those who bear the greatest responsibility, aiming to disrupt the group committing the crimes and maximizing our contribution to the prevention of future crimes. We requested thirty-one arrest warrants and summons to appear: Joseph Kony (July 8, 2005), Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005 Unsealed on October 13, 2005), Raska Lukwiya (July 8, 2005), Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005–Unsealed on October 13, 2005), Vincent Otti (July 8, 2005–Unsealed on October 13, 2005), Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (February 10, 2006–Unsealed on March 17, 2006), Bosco Ntaganda (August 22, 2006–Unsealed on April 28, 2008; Second warrant: July 13, 2012), Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (April 27, 2007), Ahmad Muhammad Harun (April 27, 2007), Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (July 6, 2007– Unsealed on February 7, 2008), Germain Katanga (July 2, 2007 Unsealed on October 15, 2007), Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo (June 10, 2008), Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (March 4, 2009–July12, 2010), Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (May 7, 2009–Unsealed on May 17, 2009), Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain (Issued under seal on August 27, 2009, Unsealed on June 15, 2010. Arrest warrant: 11, September 2014), Sylvestre Mudacumura (August 27, 2009–Unsealed on June 15, 2010), Saleh Mohamed Jerbo Jamus (August 27, 2009–Unsealed on June 15, 2010), Callixte Mbarushimana (September 25, 2010–Unsealed on October 11, 2010), Mohamed Hussein Ali (March 8, 2011), Joshua Arap Sang (March 8, 2011), William Samoei Ruto (March 8, 2011), Francis Kirimi Mutaura (March 8, 2011), Henry Kiprono Kosgey (March 8, 2011), Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (March 8, 2011), Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (June 27, 2011), Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi (June 27, 2011), Abdullah Al- Senussi (June 27, 2011), Laurent Gbagbo (November 23, 2011), Charles Ble Goude (December 21, 2011), Simone Gbagbo (February 29, 2012–Unsealed on November 22, 2012), Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein (March 1, 2012)). ↩︎
19. “We recognize the role of the International Criminal Court in a multilateral system that aims to end impunity and establish the rule of law, and in this respect, we welcome the States that have become parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and call upon all States that are not yet parties to the Statute to consider ratifying or acceding to it, and emphasize the importance of cooperation with the Court.” G.A. Res. 67/1, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/1 (Nov. 30, 2012). ↩︎
20. U.N. SCOR, 67 Sess., 6849th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6849 (Resumption 1) (Oct. 17, 2012) and U.N. SCOR, 67 Sess., 6849th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6849 (Oct. 17, 2012). See the concept paper at Permanent Rep. of Guatemala to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 1, 2012, from the Permanente Rep. of Guatemala to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. S/2012/731 (Oct. 1, 2012). ↩︎
21. Luis Moreno Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Statement made at the Ceremony of the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003). ↩︎
22. Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” (2016). All Faculty Scholarship. 1686. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1686 ↩︎
23. John. O. Brennan, John Brennan on Transnational Threats to Global Security, Council on Foreign Relations (June 29, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/event/john-brennan-transnational-threats-global-security ↩︎
24. Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?” (2016). All Faculty Scholarship. 1686. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1686 ↩︎
25. Aryeh Neier, “Defending my enemy, American Nazis, the Skokie case, and the risks of freedom.”E.P. Dutton, New York, 1979. p 5 ↩︎